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Humans in Networks Inter-Asia
Eric Kerr, Connor Graham, and Alfred Montoya
© 2018 Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan
Abstract This special issue explores the conceptions of the human that emerge out of
the form and the design of information and communications technologies (ICTs).
Geographically, our focus compares two countries with a relatively high level of
ICT penetration—South Korea and Singapore—and two countries with a relatively
low level—India and Vietnam. In each country we see how different forms of the
human emerge, in part out of the ways in which technological infrastructure develop
and intertwine with social order. In this introductionwe reflect on the long genealogy of
“human” and “humanity” and the more recent history of ICTs in Asia.
Keywords information and communications technologies ▪ human ▪ human rights ▪
networks ▪ infrastructure
Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto—I am human, nothing human is alien to
me—wrote the Roman playwright Terence. One could scarcely imagine someone
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writing such words today—quite the opposite. Increasingly, people recognize that the
idea of a human (orMan, or people, racewhen describing a species, citizen, etc.) is not
just an idea with a contingent and protean history. It is more and more constructed by
the technologies people use to track, categorize, and define one another. This special
issue asks not only what happens when technology and humans merge (cf. Ma 2016)
but also what idea of the human does the form and design of information and com-
munications technologies (ICTs) and their networks assume or anticipate. The issue
aims to critically consider the intersection between networks and humans, both the idea
of “the human” and human beings, in Asian contexts: India, Singapore, South Korea,
and Vietnam.1 Our collection treats both those countries with highly developed ICT
infrastructure and those with low ICT penetration. We bring together perspectives on
and from Asia in the five papers and one essay that comprise this issue.
Positioning this discussion within Asia is pertinent for a number of reasons. First,
within Asia, East and Southeast Asia are the fastest-growing markets in the world for
Internet andmobile communications technology (Lee 2017). In Southeast Asia, people
engage in online social networking sites far more than the global average (Abbott
2015). Indonesia, for example, has the third largest number of Twitter users in the
world and the fourth largest number of Facebook users, about 220 million (Abbott
2013). Vietnam, for its part, has nearly 40 million Internet users—nearly 43 percent of
the national population—with an estimated 8.5 million Vietnamese citizens utilizing
social media and a new Vietnamese user joining Facebook every three seconds
(Morris-Jung 2015). Second, considerable differences and disparities exist within
Asia as a region. For example, India, although boasting a total of 481 million Internet
users, has a rural Internet penetration rate of just over 20 percent (IANS 2018), and 19
percent of the population are active social media users (Hootsuite and We Are Social
2018).
In addition, long before the Arab Spring, activists in Asia utilized ICT-enabled
networks to organize mass civil society mobilizations against ruling authorities. In
1998, for instance, Indonesian activists and students used early online bulletin boards
to coordinate protests against the thirty-year Suharto dictatorship, and early political
bloggers in Malaysia took to online forums during the Reformasi protests after the
arrest of Anwar Ibrahim (Abbott 2013). The potentially transformative power of these
technology-enabled networks has not been lost on scholars (see Huang et al. 2017; Lee
2017; Edwards, Choi, and Ho 2017; Liu 2013), or on state authorities. For example, in
the wake of the Arab Spring, rattled Cambodian dictator Hun Sen was reported to have
said, “I not only weaken the opposition, I’m going to make them dead . . . and if
anyone is strong enough to try to hold a demonstration, I will beat all those dogs
and put them in a cage” (Human Rights Watch 2015).
Other scholars have examined controls on and censorship of technology-mediated
networks across different types of regimes in Southeast Asia (see Liu 2014) and in
specific contexts, such as South Korea (see Fish 2009) and China (see Xu and Feng
2015; Pan 2017). These sophisticated analyses, often quite nuanced, are typically
conducted with an eye toward what these might mean for the region’s potential for
1 Here we deploy the term the human to mean the idea of the human or humans in discourse, the term human
beings to mean the living, breathing bipeds humans are, and the terms human and humans to mean both.
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democracy or civil society, seeking to support the work of digital activists and rights
groups and other “positive deviants” (Xu and Feng 2015) against authoritarian
regimes. This is particularly true of such scholarship on China, where patient consid-
erations of the meanings and consequences of the Golden Shield/Great Firewall, Inter-
net, and social media addiction (see Shao et al. 2018;Wang et al. 2013) and the effect of
Internet penetration on political beliefs (see Wang 2014) abound. Though our special
issue does not include a contribution to this literature on China, no special issue can do
anything but aspire to a comprehensive completeness. From our brief survey of the
massive literature on ICTs, networks, and the Internet in China, it is clear that this
scholarship, like that on the rest of the countries that are represented in the cases
included in this issue, perform different orders and types of analyses.
It has been our desire to do something different in this issue, to take a risk by reading
across the grain of these types of analyses; to ask, for instance, not what the conse-
quences/reasons of/for the Great Firewall are, or how Internet use transforms political
beliefs in Asia, but what kind of human do states in Asia take the citizen for, that it
built and maintains such an infrastructure?, or what is the Chinese subject/human
today, and how does she understand herself vis-à-vis the aspired-to circumscriptions
of her ICT networks? That is, we ask what kind of human is assumed/envisioned by
these maneuvers and technical interventions, and what kind of human emerges from
an engagement with (social, political, technological, etc.) networks with these spe-
cific parameters, forms, and values. That we engage both ideas about humans, or
the human, and ideas about human beings reflects that networks, like Internets,
both produce multiple narratives and are generative of forms of life (see Graham
et al., this issue).
The diversity of political regimes, levels of digital literacy, and depth of ICT pen-
etration across Asia (again, as discussed by Graham et al. in this issue) makes the
region a problem space where comparison and juxtaposition can bear real fruit. It is our
sincere hope that, by presenting the cases described in the contributions to this special
issue in all their complexity, fruitful visions and revisions of the human and new ways
of knowing, critiquing, and developing knowledge about the human may become
possible.
Specifically, this issue centers onwhat extant visions and imaginations of the human
in Asia, across different levels of ICT development and different engagements with the
Internet, are evident.2 We have focused on three guiding questions:
 What different visions and imaginations of the human have been prevalent in
Asian and inter-Asian contexts through different historical periods, but especially
in the contemporary?
 What role have networks had in propagating, constructing, and/or resisting par-
ticular visions and imaginations of the human in Asian and inter-Asian contexts?
 What has been the extent of influence of these visions and imaginations of the
human in relation to networks on design and policy making?
2 Here we draw on Arjun Appadurai’s definitions of fantasy and imagination, or “thought divorced from
projects and actions” (1996: 7) and “collective social fact” that is “a staging ground for action” (5, 7). Central
to this distinction is that “mass media throughout the world often provokes resistance, irony, selectivity and,
in general, agency” as opposed to imaginative escape (7).
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This issue has both required and enabled us to perform some definitional work on
the terms humans and networks and the visions and imaginations associated with them
through examining specific instances of ICT-enabled networks within nation-states.
However, as the articles in the issue show, the nation itself, whether a vision, imagi-
nation, or territory, is increasingly inflected by the internationalizing force of
technology-enabled networks.
1 The Human and Networks
The title of this special issue provokes a question concerning not only the extent to
which human beings are now networked via ICTs but also the extent to which network
technologies configure human beings and conceptions of humanness.We have ordered
the contributions to initially explore the less considered ways in which human beings
are configured and reconfigured, conceived and reconceived through ICT-enabled
networks, through the work of Itty Abraham and Alfred Montoya. Michiel Baas and
Sora Park then shift the focus to particular collections of humans configured and
reconfigured within such networks. The contributions by Chihyung Jeon and by Con-
nor Graham, Eric Kerr, Natalie Pang, and Michael M. J. Fischer return to considering
humans embedded within ICT-enabled networks, showing that such networks are not
only capable of bringing forth new forms of human life but also productive of narra-
tives about themselves and humans.
The networked nature of humans has a long history, as Peter Sloterdijk argues in his
short essay In the Shadow of Mount Sinai (2015). Sloterdijk notes the following: “It is
no coincidence that ethnologists, anthropologists and theologians have been claiming
for some time that no indications have been found anywhere in the world pointing to
the existence of completely ‘irreligious peoples’—and how could they, when the
phenomenon of peoples as such is engendered only by the collective-integrative effects
of shared rites and histories, conventionally known as ‘religions’” (9). Human beings, by
definition, consist in “stabilized collectives” bound by “connecting media” acquainted
through symbolic bonds, shared histories and normative commitments (9). As the arti-
cles by Baas and Park show, human beings can likewise be formed and defined by some
other connecting media, transforming an otherwise random crowd of bodybuilders and
teens into what Sloterdijk calls a “physically and spiritually self-reproducing unit” (10).
At the same time, there are competing visions and imaginations of humans and
humanity, definitions that are inflected by ICT-enabled networks. Specifically, human-
ity, in the sense of a species-wide entity with some unspecified but presumably col-
lective interests, must be abstracted from experience and constructed. This has been
done differently at different times and in different places. Michel Foucault (1971: 387)
calledMan “an invention of recent date.” For Foucault, the collective concept of Man
emerged with modern society, and is bound up in Enlightenment-era ways of knowing,
objectivity, and notions of scientific and historical progress.Man is associated not only
with “European culture since the sixteenth century” (Foucault 1971: 386) but also with
the development of modern medicine, the rise of rationality, and a decline in the power
of religion in this context. In his latest book on secular humanism, John Gray (2018)
shows how philosophers like Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill replaced a belief in
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God with a certain vaguely transcendental collective concept of the human. Going
further, he argues that this idea is an inheritance from monotheism. The human that is
found in human rights, by way of comparison, is also a relatively recent invention and
has its history in a specifically European geography and is profoundly connected to the
end of the Second World War and with the United Nations as a configuration of actors
maintained through modern technologies such as air travel, communication technol-
ogies, and a consolidated notion of the international justice system (Moyn 2011;
Montoya 2012; Graham and Montoya, 2018). As Man and collective humanity are
associated with the Enlightenment, so the human is associated with the rise of global
capitalism and neoliberalism and their coproduced technology-enabled networks. As
the imagination of an individual, rights-bearing, current Indian citizen is enabled
through the design of a national database (see Abraham, this issue), so the vision of
a generic, if superhuman, future Korean is sustained through the “information-based
technoscientific network” (see Jeon, this issue).
Other versions of humans have populated and continue to populate the collective
imagination and popular fantasies. Anthropology, archaeology, and biology show us
that Homo sapiens is a relatively young species, related to, but distinct from, a variety
of archaic human and human-like creatures that were descended from Homo erectus.
The term Homo sapiens itself, “wise man,” was introduced by Carl Linnaeus in his
Systema Naturae published in 1758 (Koerner 1999: 87) and is but one of many col-
lective terms humans have employed to describe or distinguish themselves. Another
such definition from the ancient European context is Aristotle’s zoon politikon, the
political or “state-building” animal. In the Nicomachean Ethics (I.13) and De anima
(III.11) Aristotle asserted the humans have the capacity, which supposedly other ani-
mals lacked, for goal-oriented, rationally formulated plans. Medieval Aristotelians
later developed these ideas, referring to the human as the animal rationabile (rational
animal). By the Enlightenment era, and with the consolidation of new forms of eco-
nomic and social life, the human evolved into homo economicus (economic man), a
term first used by John Stuart Mill. Such a human being, for scholars like Mill, Adam
Smith, and David Ricardo, was understood primarily as a social creature driven by
rational self-interest. This human has been readily adopted by and some argue con-
strain (Frey 2001) modern economics.
More recent definitions, critical of the reductive notion of the human as simply a
self-interested rational being, identify the human in terms of its connectedness to
others. Alasdair MacIntyre, in After Virtue: A Study of Moral Theory (1981), described
humans as narrative beings who need to ask themselves, “Of what stories do I find
myself a part?” (2003 [1981]: chap. 15). Hannah Arendt wrote of the animal laborans,
the laboring animal (Arendt 1958), and Ernst Cassirer of the animal symbolicum, the
symbolizing animal (Cassirer 1923, 1925, 1929). Reginia Gagnier and John Dupré
describe humans as “highly gregarious interdependent social primates” (1998), a more
specific and serious taxonomic step above Plato’s famous definition of the human as
the featherless biped.More recently, Tobias Rees’s (2014: 460) work on the emergence
of the global health apparatus as a “humanity plan” also notes this: “Humanity is . . .
rather a future, something we work toward. It is not a reality, yet.” According to Rees,
bioscientists and health humanitarians are increasingly defining humans biologically,
in inclusive, global terms, beyond the confines of the social and the “national society-
fostering logic” of the nation-state that defined twentieth-century humanitarian thinking
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(470). For these actors, the nation-state is “a failed humanity project, precisely because
the humanity that the nation-state secures is always an exclusive one, one focused on
the nation—on the national society—only” (270). In this radical perspective, state-
lessness “appears in a different, (almost) positive light,” this “positivization of the
stateless” representing a “major mutation of the 250-year-old space that has opened up
the possibility of humanity” (471).
This special issue continues to document the imagined and envisaged versions of
humans and humanness into the present within the context of Asia, spurring the ques-
tion, why have particular scholars, embedded in different disciplinary contexts and
through time, proposed different definitions and different versions of the human?
Certainly, the drive to express and emphasize, perhaps even create, aspects of human-
ness that go beyond the simply biological (e.g., big-brained) is evident (Harari 2015).
Goethe’s homo aestheticus, the homo faber of Marx and Arendt (1958), the homo
ludens (Huizinga 1949), homo loquens (Herder 1784), or the bare life of homo sacer
(Agamben 1998) draw attention to specific, sometimes competing, aspects of humans.
While delicately mapping these different, historically situated versions of the human
onto specific papers is beyond the scope of this introduction, the very existence of such
proposals, and absences of many of them from the specific cases we present in this
issue, reminds us that who humans think they are is highly variable and draws attention
to how particular versions of the human are both influential and framed by and shaped
by particular collectives and states. Implicit in such near-constant renaming and reim-
agining are new and challenging readings of each of their contemporary situations and
key human relations in particular. In our survey of these iterations and uses of homowe
realize their situatedness in a region, Europe, and their articulation with regard to
nation (e.g., homo economicus) and even empire (e.g., homo sapiens).
These attempts to categorize and therefore identify the boundary between the
human and the nonhuman—especially those that explicitly refer to or even exclude
ICTs—account for the possibility that we can define ourselves by our construction and
use of tools and our environment, but not that the forms our technologies take already
assume or rely on an often unspoken vision of the human, or that technologies can
conversely create a particular imagination according to “their” priorities and distinc-
tions. Today, as shown by this special issue, and the work of Abraham and Jeon in
particular, it is clear that we are not the only ones with the power to make distinctions
and to categorize. Our machines, the products of that capacity which has been taken to
separate us from nonhumans, are themselves producing and/or organizing visions and
definitions of the human. This situation promises to intensify how and when we are
considered with and through advanced, post-industrial ICTs. The creature we are is
increasingly being understood and augmented through technological extensions,
mediations, representations, and simulations. Such technologies, today as ever, are
deeply connected to and evocative of how we understand, describe, and see ourselves,
and even inscribe the terms through which we do so.
So, in this special issue we wish to build on this departure from the consideration of
the human broadly (which typically means in and from the perspective of the West) to
investigate, as opposed to assume, its portability. Here we set out to interrogate the
visions and imaginaries of humans being generated in Asia. We have paired these
humans with networks to evoke connectedness, mobility, mediation, extension, and
two of our core foci in this special issue; circulation and representation. Networks not
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only connect humans but also represent them, providing access to new perspectives on
the human. Through six contributions we aim to advance the understanding of the term
human today by critically considering particular cases across different geographies and
cultures in a region that is beginning to confront the visions, imaginations, and realities
of a fourth industrial revolution. While historians may argue over whether such events
and changes qualify as revolutionary, it is clear that, in the words of Klaus Schwab
(2015), the founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum, credited
with bringing the term fourth industrial revolution to its current consciousness in
twenty-first-century politics, the speed, scale, and impact of developing and emerging
ICT innovations are set to change, “the way we live, work, and relate to one another.”
The consequences of this are already well under way in Asia with various governments
responding to and embracing the possibilities of ICBM (Internet of Things, cloud
computing, big data, and mobile) technology, such as Singapore’s Smart Nation ini-
tiative, Made in China 2025, and India’s 100 Smart Cities project. Relatedly, according
to the United Nations’ International Labour Organization (2016), nearly 60 percent of
employees in Southeast Asian regions will be left fearing for their jobs “in the next
couple of decades” because of automation.
2 The Contributions in This Special Issue
Returning to the questions we posed above, what visions and imaginations of the
human are articulated then in the articles in this special issue? What does each contri-
bution show us about how the relationship between humans and networks envisioned
or imagined by certain actors? And how is this relationship related to reality and
brought into being by these actors?
Abraham tackles a complex of issues surrounding one of the largest existing bio-
metric identification databases (with over 1 billion signees), the Indian Aadhaar. He
provides a prehistory of Aadhaar, in the style of Tung-Hui Hu’s A Prehistory of the
Cloud (2015), with a particular focus on the human body and biopower. Abraham
traces how data extracted from the body (and its constituent parts) form a series of
“narrative turning points” toward the state’s ambition of a complete and universal
database, which in turn produces a society with a different meaning. Through tech-
niques of varying reliability—including fingerprinting, DNA testing, neuroimaging,
polygraphs, hypnosis, and “truth serums”—he situates Aadhaar within a longer infra-
structural and ideological history. His article brings out complications surrounding
privacy, identity, and surveillance that rarely surface in US- and European-focused
discussion of identity card systems. Abraham shows that, while poor and technolog-
ically remote (in the sense of resources, skills, and culture) Indians aremore likely to be
enthusiastic about Aadhaar, primarily since it gives them the chance to become “leg-
ible” to the government, new issues, obstacles, and bureaucratic machinations appear.
New categories and accompanying narratives are also reified and constructed, permit-
ting new exclusions, all veiled by the centrality and apparent undeniable truth of
readings of the body and the work of the algorithm within human networks.
Montoya considers how “a global risks- and rights-bearing figure,” the human at the
center of human rights and humanitarian discourse and practice, emerged in the post–
World War II period. This figure was responsible for the transformation of HIV/AIDS
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aid provision in Vietnam, relying on the nation-state and its own abstract ambiguity for
legitimacy. He shows how, as support for HIV-related services wanes, local organiza-
tions draw on social media to build and activate specific communities to make ends
meet. The success of this turns on individual humans coming to identify with particular
communities through social media, atomizing a once broader HIV/AIDS support sys-
tem that turned on the figure of the universalizing and abstract human. This focus on
activating digitally networked community members potentially excludes those without
such access and the freedom to be visible. In this way Montoya illustrates the limits of
the human and of humanitarian and rights discourse, which turned on strategic absen-
ces, as well as the dangers of the system now taking shape in Vietnam.
Baas examines how Indian male bodybuilders display and maintain their bodies
through online networks. Social media platforms provide a space for these fitness
enthusiasts to create and maintain relations with clients and fans through this display.
He argues that ideas concerning the ideal male body have changed in India and that
Internet technologies have been key to the production, amplification, and spread of
these new norms across space, time, language, culture, and class. Baas shows how a
bodily form once situated in North America has been appropriated as a means of both
expressing middle classness and of crossing class boundaries through the circulations
association with online networks. He also shows that these same online networks
preserve and display particular, competition-ready bodies that are key to a body
builder’s identity and reputation. His article demonstrates the complex articulations
among online networks, visions of an ideal male body, and rapid social and economic
transformations in India. Representations of male bodies within such networks take on
a life of their own as they are strategically deployed to maximize exposure and client
recruitment.
Park builds on the idea of online bodily presence through shifting the focus to
human communication. Specifically, she examines the tension between the enduring
nature of “digital traces” with relation to the apparently impermanent nature of peer
social interaction through examining Korean teenagers’ use and experience of online
networks compared to Australian youths. Park’s focus is on the nature of human
communication in a context of different, coexisting networks across these groups.
Her study reveals how the process of Korean young people engaging in networks
through social media creates a distinct temporality of communication that has immedi-
acy, distinct cycles, and an ongoing and demanding trajectory that is self-perpetuating.
On the other hand, Australian teenagers were more concerned with their content’s rela-
tion to self-identity than with perpetuating cycles of feedback, acknowledgment, and
peer support. She observes how networks both extend and constrain human communi-
cation, assuming and emphasizing the human as possessing language and tools and as
developing new social obligations through the network.
Jeon completes the contributions in this collection through examining three distinct
discourses in South Korean society that exhibit less conflation than contradiction. One
state-sponsored discourse grounded in popular science imagines an immortal human of
the future. A second, again state-connected and somewhat contradictory discourse,
grounded in fertility rate statistics, imagines the Korean population of humans as
extinct in the future. The final key discourse Jeon considers originates among Korea
youth and is influenced by job insecurity, the increasing unlikelihood of marriage, and
the cost of living. This discourse imagines human life in Korea as a kind of hell. Thus,
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an evolved, ideal human is considered as a future technoscientific possibility in the
face of threat, not as an actual, living being. In contrast, a failing, threatened human is
reified through the circulations supported by computing networks while reflecting
realities of contemporary human experience and statistical views on the population
of human beings.
The contribution by Graham and colleagues is written from our perspective in
Singapore, one of the most ICT-developed countries in Asia. This development,
being both heavily state led and connected to key transformations in the country’s
self-image—the Intelligent Island, the cashless society, the Smart Nation—presents a
way to progress understandings of humans and networks in the context of Asia. It
argues for the value of pursuing a comparative minor history of the Internet in Singa-
pore through exploring its complex entanglements (both infrastructural and ideational)
with its regional neighbors. The article draws out some of the possibilities of an
approach to the Internet centered on human-technology relations, inspired by post-
phenomenology. However, it also argues for going beyond such an approach through
studying the forms of life and narratives coproduced by different Internets in Asia
through Singapore through deploying “research tracks” developed during a project
based in Singapore called Folklore and Digital Technologies in Southeast Asia. The
four themes of layers, stories, figures, and rumors are presented as analytical axes
through which to comparatively approach different Internets in Asia.
These contributions collectively show that ICT-enabled networks can, somewhat
recursively, coproduce what we term “the networked human” and “the network’s
human” and show us the importance of considering technology-enabled networks in
any contemporary imagination or vision of humans. They also suggest that recent
technoscientific advances have shaped how humans are imagined and are, as a kind
of “network,” a “barely contained riot of diverse organic and inorganic elements”
(Kera 2014: 185, 191). Thus, the collection opens up paths toward future imaginations
and realities of the human, to a time “when digital media reach beyond the arithmetic
and probabilistic and embrace the imaginative possibilities of a vectoral network that is
‘not self-identical, that plunges into accident and disappointment, and in which
machines have as much to say as humans’” (Cubitt 2011: 87–88).
The contributions have also illustrated humans beings’ inseparability from the
technology of networks today—our “originary technicity” (following Stiegler’s read-
ing of Derrida, cited in Crogan 2010: 147). As a focus on “advances in biotechnology
and genetic technology” can expand “the horizons of our human condition from the
moment of birth to the moment of death” (Ma 2015: 3), so these contributions allow us
to reconsider the development and usages of older proposals of the human critically in
tandem with speculations about the future. Donna Haraway’s cyborg in feminist stud-
ies (Haraway 1991) is captured in Jeon’s alpha human’s necessary ambivalence
and fantasy. The insulation and alienation of Paul Virilio’s (1997) terminal man in
cyber studies are articulated into the present through Park’s description of the extent
of Korean’s youth’s engagement in social media and as a possible future through
Abraham’s positioning of the Indian citizen in a database society. Toyo Ito’s (2000)
android body in architecture is evoked in the physicality and flows of Baas’s hybridized
bodybuilders in India and Montoya’s embodied sociality of gay support groups in
Vietnam. Though these versions are quite divergent, they have created and built on a
postmodern, urban vision that Lanfranco Aceti (2015) frames through his concepts of
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the postcitizens and postsociety, examining humans in the throes of vulnerability and
death. Additionally, they all depend on an interdependence that is facilitated by certain
technologies associated with digital network ICTs: microelectronics, the modern city,
and communication technology. It is our position that these shared qualities are under-
examined and point toward a problematization of individual and collective human
existence through technology-enabled networks in the twenty-first century. Graham
et al. point to how to examine these qualities of technology-enabled human networks in
the context of Asia through engaging the different scales of the tribal, the national, and
the global.
Similarly, these contributions are careful in the general claims they make about
humanness and the scale at which their claims operate in a time of increasingly
technology-enabled networks. The collection confirms our skepticism concerning
attempts to universalize human experience or make claims about what the human really
is. The assumption that there is an inner human nature that all people share across time,
geography, politics, and the like has historically been a dangerous one, shot through
with bias and myopia. Roland Barthes, for instance, in Mythologies (1972), gave a
scathing critique of the mid-twentieth-century Great Family of Man photographic
exhibit whose aim, according to Barthes, was to demonstrate the existence of “a family
of Man,” “a unity of species” that is then “molarized and sentimentalised” (100).
Barthes’s target was this “ambiguous myth of the human ‘community’” (100). This
myth was constructed, according to Barthes, on the basis of an outward exotic plurality
restrained by an assumed overarching unity that posits a shared nature that precedes
ethnic specificity: a purely formal diversity resting on a common human mold. Such
declarations rely, for Barthes, on a suppression of history, by which nature is placed “at
the bottom of History” (101) as its really real basis. This is, for Barthes, an old trope by
which beneath “the relativity of institutions” and a “superficial diversity” lies “the solid
rock of a universal human nature” (101).
3 Metaphors for Humans and Networks
The articles in this issue highlight the need not just to identify and critique the forms
of the human that emerge from and as a product of networks but to reassess com-
mon metaphors for human-technology relations from the perspective of Asia. Indeed,
Graham et al. make the argument that Singapore’s Internet should be thought of in
terms of human-technology relations, recognizing the Internet as a plurality of
technology-enabled human networks as well as emergent agential and experiential
qualities of these Internets.
At least three common metaphors describe and frame human-technology/ICT rela-
tions across these contributions: augmentation (e.g., Engelbart 1962), extension (e.g.,
Besmer 2015), and mediation (e.g., Ihde 1979).3 These metaphors are worth tracing,
even if briefly, to their conceptual origins because they are not entirely innocent. We
suggest they bring with them certain visions and imaginations concerning humans in
3 Here we are inspired by John Urry’s (2000: 22) treatment of metaphors in social science: “‘Revealing’ the
metaphorical basis of diverse forms of thought is a major task and goal of social science.”
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particular and that tracing them to a conceptual source of sorts will help expose this
baggage. We suggest three such origins here: Douglas Engelbart’s 1962 report “Aug-
menting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework,”MauriceMerleau-Ponty’s “Phe-
nomenology of Perception” (translated into English, coincidentally, also in 1962), and
Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964). Though
each of these works is complex and their concerns and analyses overlap, we found it
useful as a heuristic device to think of Engelbart’s (1962) notion of augmentation as
focused on mind, Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) notion of extension as primarily focused on
the body, and McLuhan (1964) as focused on language and communication.
Engelbart’s (1962) cognitivist notion of augmentation is envisaged within a
problem-solution frame: goal-driven human behavior to address societal problems.
Technologies like the digital computer are envisaged as a means of improving human
comprehension in terms of speed and effectiveness to address complex problems.
Engelbart is concerned with combining the human “feel for a situation” (1) with the
“means . . . to help man apply his native sensory, mental, and motor capabilities” (2)
in a “human-intellect system” (3). For Engelbart, objects, symbols, organizing meth-
ods, and human conditioning combined into a single system made up of “a trained
human being together with his artifacts, language and methodology” (9). In his vision,
the computer’s role is to perform low-level, real-time data storage, information proc-
essing, symbol manipulating, and visualizing tasks, supporting the dominant human
central “mind” to envisage and work through solutions and perform different kinds of
analysis. Engelbart embeds the individual human in a system of relations involving
“working environment” and “methods of working” (6). He imagines the same indi-
vidual human primarily in sensory, motor, and informational terms. In this imaginary,
language is central to the individual human intellect, and augmentation of this intellect
is thought of in terms of reducing large problems into smaller processes. In this vein,
Park’s contribution to this issue deals directly with how ICT networks both augment
and constrain human communication. The social media technologies Park examines
assume and reinforce a notion of humans as primarily language- and tool-possessing
creatures. These networked technologies, for their part, form the terrain on which
and through which young people in Korea and Australia are connecting but also on/
through which they develop new social obligations and norms in unique if not diver-
gent ways.
In contrast to Engelbart’s emphasis on the mental capacities of humans and lan-
guage, Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) phenomenological account, in association with partic-
ular technologies and artifacts, places bodily experience as central to his notion of
extension. The oft-quoted example that captures his view on human-technology rela-
tions is the blind man’s use of a cane: “The stick is no longer an object perceived by the
blind man, but an instrument with which he perceives. It is a body auxiliary, an exten-
sion of the bodily synthesis” (152). In his scheme, the body is not only an assemblage
of perceiving parts that are, in turn, perceived (via a “body image” [98]) but it is also
situated with relation to the external world and technologies or artifacts placed in it. As
Michael Polanyi (1958: 146) wrote, “We may say that when we learn [a] probe, or a
tool, and thus make ourselves aware of these things as we are of our body, we interi-
orize these things and make ourselves dwell in them.”
Merleau-Ponty (1962) uses three examples of such technologies or artifacts that
act as prostheses, auxiliaries, or dwellings: a car, a hat, a stick. He describes how
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getting used to these technologies “is to be transplanted into them, or conversely, to
incorporate them into the bulk of our own body” (143). In this way humans are
capable of “changing our existence” through such “instruments” (143) because the
body “is a system which is open on to the world, and correlative with it” (143).
Technology, in Merleau-Ponty’s work, is a means not simply of augmenting a mind
or intellect, but of extending bodily presence and therefore sensory capability in the
world: a further means of experiencing or being in the world. Baas’s contribution to
this special issue extends this mode of analysis, not simply in terms of his careful
attention to the roles and meanings ascribed to bodies and fleshly existence but in
the way social media and digital images are used by Indian fitness enthusiasts and
bodybuilders to extend the social and symbolic “shelf lives” of their competition-
ready bodies. These Indian men deploy images of themselves in online networks to
preserve and display particular, competition-ready bodies that are key to a body-
builder’s identity, reputation, and social and financial viability, functioning as true
auxiliaries of the body.
McLuhan (1994 [1964]) also uses the notion of extension, but closely couples it
with human senses, media, and information: “Today, after more than a century of
electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global
embrace” (3). These extensions are both reducible to information systems and subject
to servitude under these same systems: “Electromagnetic technology requires utter
human docility and quiescence of meditation such as befits an organism that nowwears
its brain outside its skull and its nerves outside its hide” (57). In the preface to the
second edition he emphasizes the creative and destructive force of media: “Any tech-
nology gradually creates a totally new human environment.”He presents technology as
within a historical and ongoing process of change that is generative of new human-
technology configurations. Such environments are not passive, but actively “repro-
cess” a prior environment. Additionally, speech is not only the vehicle for “an actual
process of thought” (8), it also transforms it, creating an awareness of thought, offering
a new scale of action, and extending the human across time and space. For McLuhan
this is a recursive process as “the ‘content’ of any medium is always another medium”
(8). In this account, humans are embedded in technology-human configurations that
extend senses and configure awareness but that also themselves exert agency. In this
scheme, both the mind and the body seem to recede, except to sense. Human senses are
shaped and acted on invisibly through that sensing. “The effects of technology do not
occur at the level of opinions or concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception
steadily without any resistance” (18). Mediation (of information) is at the center of
human experience and action because all (information) is mediated. The contributions
of Abraham and Montoya to this special issue represent two means of tackling this
metaphor of extension. Abraham’s analysis of the Indian Aadhaar system, and his
placement of this database in a rough genealogy of similar state and civil society
systems of legibility, tracks how the system itself becomes a way, if not the way, of
knowing and seeing for the state, such technologies creating new (but of course rec-
ognizable) human environments. Extension here occurs in a classical encompassing
way, as the map, to borrow a phrase, becomes the territory, albeit one fraught with
complexity and new problems. Montoya’s work on the fundamental absences that
allow the twentieth-century figure of the human to operate, and their articulation
with twenty-first-century configurations of politics, economic realities, and social
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media technologies in Vietnam, turns this notion of extension inside out. Local actors
deploy social media content to generate and then engage a specific local public, taking
advantage of the ambiguity of the Human, filling in its useful absences that make it
amenable to extension by proliferation or involution.
Don Ihde’s (1979) treatment of human-technology relations is instructive here. He
identifies distinct discourses in discussions of technology and distinguishes these dif-
ferent types without arguing that one is paradigmatic. He argues that rigorous analysis
of human relations with technology is necessary for understanding “the promises and
threats of technology” (15). He asserts that human-technology relations are pervasive
and that these relations have profound impacts on human life, without reducing human
existence to human-technology relations: “We live and move and have our being
among machines” (15). His scheme is phenomenological and posits an intimate, recip-
rocal relationship between human (consciousness) and world. He outlines a series of
types of relations with technology: embodiment, hermeneutic, background, and alter-
ity. Embodiment relations exist when technology is an extension of the senses when
humans “experience through a machine” (8). In this case, experience of the world can
be transformed, reduced or amplified even as the experience of the technology itself is
not salient (8). The second type of relation he describes is a hermeneutic relation, when
“the machine is something like a text” (12). In this case the technology is not trans-
parent, it becomes other, “a focal object of experience” (13). The third type he
describes comprises background relations with technology that are mostly indirect,
but constant. The final type of relations he presents is alterity relations, or the “special
experience of engaging with another human being, that significant encounter with
Otherness” (Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015: 33). The four heuristic themes identified
in Graham et al.’s contribution to this special issue not only loosely map onto these four
types of mediation but also are aligned with this fluid perspective, with its focus on
lived experience, attention to narratives/texts, and the primacy of the continuous inter-
face between the human being and the world.4 These authors argue that the Internet is
multiple, perpetually coming into being, and made up of a galaxy of geographical,
technical, infrastructural, political, social, and economic factors, apart from being
constituted by the actions of users and recursively related to their experiences, all of
this in a planet-spanning network.
Thus, in these metaphors, a body and an external, physical world are assumed. Such
metaphors are quite easily mapped onto the networked human. This term evokes a
collective, a species of animals that has transformed itself and theworld through time to
the point that it is now identified with the technologies it has created. Thus, networked
4 The layers theme relates to Ihde’s embodiment relations, when the human “experience is reshaped through
the device” (Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015: 29), but it also goes further, arguing for “the embodiment of the
human through Internet technology” (Graham et al., this issue). Stories capture hermeneutic relations or how
the human “experiences a transformed encounter with the world via the direct experience and interpretation
of the technology” (Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015: 32). This interpretation is presented and is meaningful
through one’s knowledge of language. Background relations are the human’s “relation to devices that she or
hemay not directly use but nonetheless interacts with as they shape her or his experiential surroundings” (34).
These kinds of relations connect with the rumors theme because rumors are beyond the human’s complete
control, they are not intentional in the way stories are, and yet they shape the experience of the Internet. The
figures theme engages alterity relation in the sense that other consciousnesses are encountered online that
may be accounted for as human or nonhuman, but certainly as other.
Networked Human, Network’s Human 371
human suggests a global reach and a situatedness in a broader configuration of life and
a particular technoscientific way of seeing.
However, these are only one category of relation. There is a further category that
shifts away from considering the human as having primacy in the relation. McLuhan’s
attention to mediation and Ihde’s emphasis on the importance of inquiry into “media
instruments” flows quite easily into other metaphors used to describe and frame
human-technology/ICT relations. These metaphors allow for the human to be thought
of in terms of representation. There is no primacy in the relation extending from the
human, and the human is not necessary for a relation. Such metaphors connect with the
network’s human. This term suggests a collective of animals that is less real than
imagined and represented, a collective that has become threatened by the technologies
it has created in the Anthropocene (Steffen et al. 2011). The network’s human suggests
a dependency on, and subservience to, a sociotechnical configuration for being, with-
out that being having to correspond to the real. These metaphors do not fit so easily
with the networked human as they invoke a world of high-fidelity, highly circulated
versions of humans through networks, a world in which such versions begin to exert
agency.
The quintessential example is, perhaps the simulation. For Jean Baudrillard (1994),
simulation is an “imaginary of representation” that is “produced from miniaturized
cells, matrices, and memory banks, models of control—and it can be reproduced an
indefinite number of times from these” (2). The simulation replaces the real, and, in
doing so, destroys the referent such that the difference between the “true” and the
“false,” the “real” and the “imaginary” (3) becomes impossible to discern. In this way,
simulation is “opposed to representation” because it “stems from the utopia of the prin-
ciple of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as a value . . . simulation
envelops the whole edifice of representation itself as a simulacrum” (6). Information,
media, and the mass media are implicated in this destruction because it, first, “devours
communication” through “the staging of meaning” (80) and, second, because it intro-
duces disorder into socialization, resulting in “a sort of nebulous state dedicated not to a
surplus of innovation but, on the contrary, to total entropy” (81). Jeon’s contribution to
this special issue cleaves most closely to this perspective, although Abraham’s also
gestures to this as a probable future. Jeon explores the tension between Korean popular
technoscience, which promotes the image of a future immortal human, and rising fears,
based on demography, fertility statistics, and the rise of suicide, concerning the future
extinction of the Korean people. Korean youth, buffeted by social pressures, unem-
ployment and job insecurity, poor marriage prospects, high cost of living, and the like,
have developed an apocalyptic vision of human life in Korea as a kind of hellish
simulation.
4 Conclusion
The contributions to this special issue wrestle with the different visions and imagina-
tions of humans across site in Asia. FromAbraham’s Indian citizen linked or bound in a
database society to Jeon’s Korean alpha human/resident of Hell Joseon, from Baas’s
social-media-inflected Indian bodies toMontoya’s locally cultivated Vietnamese activ-
ist publics and Park’s network-ethical youth, each of these figures arises in relationship
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to emerging technologies and emerging uses of these in layered networks of ICTs, as
actors respond to social, economic, and political realities. It is clear that in the cases our
contributors have presented, technology-enabled networks are essential to generating,
sustaining, and resisting particular visions and imaginations of the human in Asian and
inter-Asian contexts.
The extent of the influence of these visions and imaginations of humans in relation
to networks on design and policy making is more difficult to gauge. Visions of the
human are both useful to exercises of power and knowledge making and the result of
said power. Our contributors have shown how such figures of the human and their
generation and circulation on networks have meant inclusion, opportunity, and free-
dom for some and exclusion, obstacles, and new visions of hell for others.
We suggest that today we are networked humans. Being networked defines us in the
contemporary situation. At one level, this has meant that we exist insofar as we exist to
others or, more specifically, as we exist online (Floridi 2015; see also Baas, this issue;
and Park, this issue). This network also gazes back, sees us, categorizes us, decides
who among us are human andwho are not (see Abraham and Jeon, this issue). The term
network’s human provides a space for thinking of the network as an actor with an
emergent agency, as well as attributing some form of consciousness to a network that
is capable of or dependent on an imagination. The term network as it is used here cap-
tures the complex nodes and links that are formed, maintained, and eroded through
“advanced,” postindustrial technologies like ICTs but also through those technologies
that are more commonplace and mundane (Dourish et al. 2010), such as the telephone,
and second, those traditional technologies they mediate and remediate (McLuhan 1994
[1964]; Bolter and Grusin 1998), such as speech and writing. The human is shaped and
produced by the specific, layered ICTs that comprise it. This is a particular human, or
particular set of humans, and we do not pretend that the Internet connection is a
defining feature of all lives or even that those who are connected connect in some
universalizable manner that then provides the primary mode by which they understand
themselves and others.
This special issue presents case studies of humans as they are mediated through
(and, in some sense, inseparable from) the networks that configure them. It focuses on
the inflections of the human that are made visible, considered, and emphasized in the
ICT(s) described and the nature of the human-technology relations implied, as well as
how the notions of the human are articulated or sustained by particular technology-
enabled networks.
In this sense our special issue focuses on “more coproductionist concerns with the
making of natural and social orders by both science and the state through information,
data, and knowledge, through practices” (Farquhar and Sunder Rajan 2014: 387). Our
focus here is the shaping and production of human networks through ICTs and in
tracing what this shaping and production assumes. Our interest has been in not only
unpacking the experiences and agendas of users and other key actors such as designers,
but also examining the kinds of social attributions theymake in the process of the use and
assembly/construction of infrastructures. This special issue marks the beginning of an
exploration of different, and often commonly assumed, metaphors of human-technology
relations and how these might hold (or not) within and through Asia. This special issue
shows that neither these relations nor the categories they mediate are stable because they
have a reciprocal impact on one another in a landscape of change.
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It is our view that we should treat the human as a category, an always unfinished
project, an aspiration, a way of thinking and knowing about us and our place in time
and the world. The humans (Man, homo sacer, homo faber, terminal man, etc.) we
generate, place our faith in, and act on come out of particular configurations of politics,
ethics, and technology (Ong and Collier 2005), a drive to create communal identities,
to categorize, describe, organize, exclude, to make some things and ideas possible,
some impossible, and some necessary.
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